In this article, we estimate the degree of market power held by AT&T in the interstate long-distance market in the postdivestiture period. Our approach makes use of the dominant firm/competitive fringe model to impose the structure needed both to obtain estimates of the relevant structural parameters and to translate these parameters into an estimate of AT&T's residual demand elasticity and associated Lerner index. Because of the continued presence of regulation and other considerations, however, a direct estimation of the residual demand elasticity is not feasible. Consequently, we take a more indirect approach that combines estimation of the elasticity of fringe firm supply, market demand estimation, and extant market share data to generate estimates of the desired elasticity. The resulting estimates strongly support the conclusion that AT&T lacks significant market power in the postdivestiture long-distance market.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the most important policy issues in the telecommunications industry over the past decade and today has been the degree of market power held by AT&T. This issue has been the subject of extensive debate in regulatory hearing rooms throughout the country, before state and federal legislative bodies, and in the economics literature. Divergent opinions concerning this question have influenced regulatory decisions and legislative proposals ranging from relaxed regulation of this firm to removal of the restriction on entry by the Bell operating companies (BOCs) into the in-501 produced an alternative, econometrically based, approach to the evaluation of market power.4 Several alternative econometric techniques have been introduced to estimate the extent to which individual firms' output decisions influence market price. Implementing one or more of these techniques can, under certain conditions, yield an estimate of the price elasticity of the individual firm's residual demand curve. The inverse of this elasticity, then, provides a direct estimate of the Lerner index of the degree of monopoly power held by that firm.
In this article, we estimate the residual demand elasticity and associated Lerner index for AT&T in the interstate long-distance market in the postdivestiture period. Because of the continued presence of regulation and other considerations, however, direct estimation of this elasticity along traditional lines is not feasible. Consequently, we take a more indirect approach that utilizes estimates of the underlying components of the desired elasticity. This approach makes use of the dominant firm/competitive fringe (DF/CF) model to impose the structure needed both to obtain estimates of the relevant structural parameters and to translate these parameters into an estimate of AT&T's residual demand elasticity and Lerner index.
The resulting estimates strongly support the conclusion that AT&T lacks significant market power in the postdivestiture long-distance market. While such evidence is not likely to completely resolve the ongoing debate about the appropriate regulatory policy for this industry, it should contribute to the overall quality of that debate by adding an alternative empirical approach that is well founded in modem econometric methods of estimating market power.
The article is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe various conceptual considerations related to formulation of the empirical model. In Section III, we provide a description of the data and present our estimation results. The residual demand elasticity estimates and market power calculations are then reported and interpreted in Section IV. Finally, in Section V, we provide conclusions and discuss several caveats that accompany our analysis.
II. CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
Under certain conditions, natural market events may generate data that allow researchers to draw inferences about the percentage departure of price from marginal cost, even though the relevant marginal opportunity costs are generally unobservable. When such events occur, fairly generalized models of industry demand functions and individual firms' supply relations can yield estimates of structural parameters that shed light on the type of behavior exhibited by market participants, that is, whether the firms are colluding or competing.5
Within this class of models, an important approach has been estimation of firms' residual demand elasticities.6 Because of the functional relationship that exists between the individual firm's price elasticity of residual demand and the Lerner index of market power, estimation of a company's residual demand curve provides a direct method of calculating the degree of market power it enjoys.' Therefore, to evaluate the extent of AT&T's market power in the postdivestiture long-distance market, we estimate the price elasticity of this firm's residual demand.8 To provide the structure necessary to evaluate the degree of AT&T's market power in the interstate long-distance market, we make use of the DF/CF model. The principal assumptions of this model are (1) there is one firm that holds a relatively large share of the market (that is, the dominant firm); (2) there is a competitive fringe, consisting of a large number of much smaller firms, each of which takes the dominant firm's price as given; and (3) the product is homogeneous.
These assumptions appear to be reasonably well satisfied in the longdistance market during the time period covered by our data, 1984-93. First, during this period, AT&T continued to hold a relatively large share of the long-distance market. In particular, while there was a noticeable decline in AT&T's minutes-of-use market share, from 84 to 59 percent, the average share was 72 percent over this period.9 As a point of reference, some eco- 8 Direct estimation of residual demand in this market environment, however, is precluded. As explained by Baker & Bresnahan, supra note 6, at 7, estimation of residual demand functions requires identification of exogenous variables that shift one firm's marginal costs without affecting the costs of other firms in the industry. Firms competing in the long-distance market, however, all purchase essentially the same set of inputs at roughly equivalent prices. Consequently, AT&T has not experienced the sort of independent cost shifts that would allow identification of its residual demand curve from the available data. Additional structure must, therefore, be imposed on the model to permit this estimation. 440.12 At the beginning of the sample period, no single competitor to AT&T provided more than 6 percent of the interstate long-distance traffic.
As the industry structure has evolved over time, AT&T's two largest competitors, MCI and Sprint, have grown considerably. At the beginning of the sample period, the revenue-based market shares of these two firms were 5.5 and 2.6 percent, respectively. In 1988, these market shares were 10.3 and 7.2 percent, and by 1993 they had grown to 17.8 and 10.0.13 The dominant firm model assumes that the fringe competitors are individually small enough that they accept the price of the dominant firm as given in determining their supply response. The classification of MCI and Sprint as fringe firms is admittedly a matter of judgment. We believe, however, it is justified by the relatively new positions of these firms in the market and their relatively small market shares during the period in question. As these firms continue to grow, it becomes increasingly less clear by the mid-1990s that the long-distance industry still conforms well to the assumptions of the DF/CF model.14 Another important benchmark for the application of the DF/CF model is the degree of product homogeneity. In a pure DF/CF model, all of the firms' products are perfectly homogeneous. Clearly, this is a simplifying abstraction that is rarely, if ever, met in empirical modeling. At the same time, application of the theoretical model should be applied to industries that at least approximately conform to the assumption. Additionally, however, the pure DF/CF model that assumes perfect product homogeneity may be modified to account for any tangible sources of product differentiation that may be part of the industry in question.'6 In the case of the long-distance market over the 1984-93 period, the primary source of product differentiation was the lack of dialing parity between AT&T and its competitors. Specifically, in the absence of switching upgrades by the local exchange companies, known as "equal access," AT&T uniquely enjoyed "1 +" dialing at the time of the divestiture. In the absence of equal access, customers of all other long-distance companies were forced to dial additional digits to access their long-distance carrier before dialing the number of the party with whom they wished to speak. Beginning in 1984, and continuing throughout the sample period, however, local exchange companies have increasingly deployed equal access in their central office switches. By the end of the sample period, 97 percent of all telephone lines nationwide were converted to equal access.17 Coincident with the proliferation of equal access and the increasing recognition of product homogeneity in the supply of long-distance services, the prices of these services have rapidly '" The comparability of the technical quality of long-distance service provided by interexchange firms is well established. See, for example, Mary Jander, Users Rate Long-Distance, 22 Data Comm. 89, 92 (1993). Evidence of consumers' willingness to switch long-distance carriers is found in Robert E. Allen, Testimony before the United States Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, September 8, 1993, wherein it is noted that in 1992, over 16 million customers switched their long-distance carriers. Advertising is a potential source of product differentiation. Several points, however, indicate that the advertising in the long-distance market is not a significant impediment to the applicability of the DF/CF model. First, virtually all industries engage in advertising. To the extent that advertising provides information regarding, say, pricing, its presence should not be a seen as indicative of significant product differentiation. Second, while advertising is common in the long-distance market, it was not, by U.S. advertising standards, "intense" during the sample period. For example, advertising to sales ratios for AT&T for the 1984-88 period were roughly 1 percent. No major carrier's advertising to sales ratio exceeded 5 percent over this period. See Porter, supra note 3. Finally, the proliferation of customer switching indicates that, although there is considerable effort by long-distance carriers to engender brand loyalty, advertising has not, in fact, created significant product differentiation. Given the DF/CF model, the residual demand curve faced by AT&T is given by the total market demand curve minus the collective supply curve of the competitive fringe; that is,
where P is the price of long-distance service, QATT(P) is AT&T's residual demand, QM(P) is market demand, and QF(P) is fringe supply. Due to the price-taking behavior exhibited by fringe producers, QF(P) is given by the collective marginal cost curve of these firms. Equation (1) may be manipulated to obtain the dominant firm's residual demand elasticity as a function of three underlying structural parameters: 
Here, QF is the fringe output, PA is the price long-distance firms pay to the local exchange companies on a minutes-of-use basis for access to the local network, and EA is the percentage of telephone lines converted to equal access. Carrier access is the predominant input required for the production of long-distance service, generally accounting for over half of these firms' total costs (and even more of their marginal costs). Thus, 3PFf/PA > 0 is expected to hold. As noted above, the primary source of product differentiation in the postdivestiture long-distance industry has been the lack of dialing parity between AT&T and its rivals. To explicitly account for this element of product differentiation, we include a measure of the proliferation of equal access (EA) in the long-distance industry over time. We expect that, as the degree of product homogeneity increases with growth in the extent of equal access, the ability of fringe suppliers to expand their output is increased, ceteris paribus, and price pressure on the dominant firm will grow. Accordingly, we expect that 3PFf/EA < 0. That is, equal access shifts fringe supply outward.
Finally, because fringe supply is expected either to slope upward or to be horizontal, )PFlaQF > 0 should hold. It is this last parameter, of course, that is the primary focus of our attention, because it reveals the ability and willingness of AT&T's competitors to enter and expand in response to any attempted price increases. That ability, in turn, is a primary determinant of AT&T's market power. The closer this parameter is to zero (that is, the more elastic is fringe supply), the lower are barriers to entry and expansion and, therefore, the greater the intensity of potential competition. Conversely, a large positive coefficient on QF would indicate a relatively inelastic fringe supply with comparatively ineffective potential competition.
Turning to the inverse market demand function for long-distance service, we specify P = PM (QM, PL, PHONE, PHONESQ, Y, Di),
where QM is the market quantity, PL is an index of real prices for local telephone service, PHONE is the number of U.S. households that subscribe to telephone service, PHONESQ is the square of PHONE, Y is real per capita income, and Di is a vector of three quarterly dummies. We expect market demand to slope downward. We expect increases in the price of local telephone service to reduce the demand for long-distance service due to the complementary nature of these products. 20 We expect increases in household subscribership generally to increase market demand. We allow for a nonlinear (quadratic) relationship between subscribership and demand due to the network characteristic of telecommunications consumption-a doubling of subscribers is likely to more than double the market demand. Finally, we expect increases in income to increase long-distance demand.
Thus, our hypotheses regarding equation (4) 
III. DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
Within the framework of the DF/CF model, the market price, the quantity supplied by fringe firms, and the market quantity are determined simultaneously. Thus, estimation of the fringe supply and market demand functions with ordinary least squares would produce inconsistent and biased parameter estimates. Accordingly, we utilize two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the model. The data used for this estimation are quarterly observations covering the time period from 1984:3 through 1993:4. Thus, our sample contains 38 observations. Appendix Table Al 22 The model was also estimated with three-stage least squares (3SLS). Because the 3SLS results are virtually identical to the 2SLS results, we report only the latter here. Also, the model was estimated using both linear and double-log specifications. Because the basic results are invariant to the specification, we report the estimations from the linear specification. and all coefficients attain the expected signs. Moreover, all parameters are statistically significant. The positive sign on the coefficient of QF indicates an upward-sloping fringe supply. The positive sign on the coefficient of PA suggests that fringe supply shifts backward with increases in the price of the principal input (that is, access). The negative sign attached to the coefficient of EA confirms our expectation that the provision of equal access and the commensurate decreases in the degree of product differentiation increase fringe supply. Most important, the 2SLS results produce a fringe supply elasticity estimate of 4.38 at the sample means. Thus, our results suggest a large supply response to a price change on the part of fringe firms in this industry.23 This finding, in turn, is consistent with prior arguments that have posited an absence of significant barriers to entry and expansion in this industry.24 Next, Table 2 reports our estimation results for the interstate longdistance telecommunications market demand function using 2SLS. Here, too, the results appear to be quite reasonable. The model exhibits considerable explanatory power, and all hypothesized coefficient signs are obtained. Moreover, all coefficients except the second-quarter dummy are significant at the .05 level or higher. These results confirm a downward-sloping market demand that declines with higher local telephone rates. The coefficients attached to PHONE and PHONESQ suggest a U-shaped relationship between subscribership and long-distance demand. At the sample mean, however, aP/fPHONE = 0.0093 > 0, and )2P/)PHONE2 = 0.002 > 0. Thus, at these values, demand increases at an increasing rate as subscribership rises. This result is consistent with theoretical expectations for products subject to network externality effects. Finally, long-distance demand increases with per capita income (it is a normal good) and is significantly higher in the third and fourth quarters. For our purposes, the result that is of primary importance is the market price elasticity of demand. At the sample means, the results reported in Table 2 yield an elasticity estimate of -0.49. Given the time-series nature of our data, this estimate should correspond to a short-run demand elasticity. Accordingly, this figure conforms with, but is at the low end of the range of, elasticities for this market reported in a recent survey of telecommunications demand studies.25 Consequently, use of this relatively low market price elasticity estimate will tend to bias our Lerner index calculations upward. Comparing Hall's estimates to our estimates for AT&T, we find that, relative to these other industries, AT&T possesses remarkably little market power. The mean value of our Lerner index estimates is .20 for AT&T, while the mean of the 22 industries for which Hall's estimates fall within the theoretically acceptable range (that is, for which 0 -, < 1) is .62. Moreover, the maximum estimate of , we obtain for AT&T is .29. This value is below every single industry in Hall's sample that generated a Lerner index value within the acceptable range, with the single exception of preted cautiously. For example, local telephone exchange, long-distance, and cable television operations are combined to yield an aggregated estimate for "Communications." An additional caveat to the use of Hall's estimates stems from the fact that they are built on a data series that ends in 1984. Despite these caveats, Hall's Lerner index values nonetheless provide a useful benchmark for comparison purposes. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
At the time of the divestiture of the BOCs from AT&T, considerable debate emerged concerning the long-run viability of competition in the longdistance telecommunications industry. In the period since divestiture, that debate has shifted to a consideration of the intensity of competition faced by the former monopoly supplier of long-distance service. To date, however, the arguments presented have proceeded primarily on a priori theoretical grounds pertaining to conditions of natural monopoly and largely ad hoc analyses of the emerging structural characteristics of the industry. While evidence of this nature is valuable in attempting to resolve this important public policy issue, it is important to attempt to corroborate such information with empirical studies as the requisite data become available. In this spirit, we have employed the DF/CF model to estimate both fringe supply and market demand elasticities in the interstate long-distance telecommunications market. We have employed the resulting elasticity estimates along with extant information on AT&T's market share to calculate empirical estimates of AT&T's market power.
As with any empirical analysis, our results should be interpreted in the light of several caveats. First, our data series is relatively short, with only a 10-year window of observations. Ironically, given the empirical propensity of dominant firms to decline, the benefits of a longer time series may ultimately be offset by a declining applicability of the underlying DF/CF model to this industry. Thus, the window of opportunity for modeling this industry with the DF/CF model may be waning as the industry structure evolves.
Second, as with other industries that have experienced the transition from regulated monopoly to competition, new pricing structures are emerging in the long-distance industry that limit the relevance of "list" prices. A noticeable deviation of average revenue per minute (that is, the actual transactions price) of long-distance service sold and the basic tariffed price began to emerge at the end of our sample period with the introduction of a variety of discount pricing plans by long-distance suppliers. To the extent that competition has increasingly driven transactions prices below the basic tariffed prices used in this study, our results regarding the competitive discipline imposed by the various competitors to the "dominant" firm are strengthened, and our empirical conclusions are seen to be quite conservative.
Third, while the theoretical construct is ideally designed to model the 514 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS market power held by AT&T for the set of long-distance services provided, the empirical model and data are limited to basic tariffed rates that apply to residential and small business consumers. Other services (for example, WATS) designed for use by high-volume consumers and discount programs available to residential customers are excluded from the empirical analysis. It is generally conceded that competition for these high-end services is keen and that no carrier has significant market power over these services.33 To the extent, then, that our empirical model is focused on the low-volume end of the market, our estimates of the Lerner index will, again, tend to err on the high side. Yet another caveat stems from the presence of regulation in the longdistance market. Specifically, our estimation of the Lerner index is predicated on the ability of the dominant firm to be able to equate marginal cost and the marginal revenue associated with the residual demand curve. To the extent that regulation may be binding, the profit-maximizing price of the dominant firm will be higher than observed prices and the corresponding estimate of the Lerner index is too low. Given, however, the previous empirical research demonstrating that relaxing regulatory controls in this market leads to lower prices, any distortions to our Lerner value estimates, if any, are likely to be minimal.34
With these caveats noted, we conclude by suggesting that the approach adopted here of simultaneous estimation of fringe firm supply and market demand elasticities, when combined with marketplace data on market shares, offers a new and potentially useful tool for market power evaluations when more conventional residual demand estimation methods are unavailable. 
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